The dynamics of social networks can determine the transmission of information, the spread of diseases, and the evolution of behavior. Despite this broad importance, a general framework for 18 predicting social network stability has not been proposed. Here, we present longitudinal data on the social dynamics of a cooperative bird species, the wire-tailed manakin, to evaluate the 20 potential causes of temporal network stability. We find that when partners interact less frequently, and when the breadth of social connectedness within the network increases, the social 22
The negative association between network density and stability was unexpected, given that connectedness in a cooperative system without defection is thought to foster social cohesion 92 (31). To provide a mechanistic explanation for this result, we built a simulation model based on the hypothesis that individual behaviors would drive emergent properties of the system (32, 33) . 94
In this model, the individuals iteratively sought partnerships with each other at each time step. The model assumed three simple rules that describe a scenario of reciprocity (24) with among-96 individual heterogeneity (32, 34): (i) social partnerships are formed through reciprocal partner choice, wherein both individuals must choose each other; (ii) individuals prefer social partners 98 with whom they have previously interacted (35); and (iii) there are consistent among-individual differences in the expression of social behaviour. This third assumption of among-individual 100 behavioral heterogeneity is ubiquitous in human and animal behavior (34) and has been shown to influence collective performance (36) and the evolution of cooperation (37, 38) . It is important to 102 note that our simulation model made no assumptions as to the source of this among-individual heterogeneity (which could be caused by genetic, environmental, age-related, or other factors). 104 We ran this simulation on 3,000 initial networks that were generated de novo to represent a broad range of network sizes, weights, and densities, and we used these initial networks to 106 parameterize (ii) and (iii). We then allowed the individual nodes to repeatedly interact with each other. Finally, we computed the stability of each simulation run, by comparing the initial 108 structure to the one that resulted from the newly simulated interactions. Similar to the manakin data, we found that networks with a relatively high frequency of 110 cooperation (high weight) but sparse connectivity (low density) were more stable (Fig. 2) .
Hence, the simple model of reciprocity plus heterogeneity was sufficient to recreate the 112 dynamics observed in the empirical networks. Moreover, we found that the null model simulations that lacked all three assumptions (i-iii), or that included only (i), (ii), or (iii) alone, 114
were insufficient to generate the empirical patterns of stability. In null models that lacked reciprocity, denser networks were also consistently more stable, making the negative effect 116 observed in the empirical data particularly striking (Fig. 2b) . Overall, our findings indicate that both behavioral processes, reciprocity and heterogeneity, are necessary to recreate the weight and 118 density effects on network stability. Finally, we found that the larger simulated networks with more individuals were also significantly less stable, independent of network weight and density. 120
This effect of network size was also consistent with the manakin data (although in the empirical analysis, it was not quite statistically significant; Table S3 ). 122
Why are some social partnerships able to persist through time (7, 18, 29, 30) ? To understand how social structure might influence the fidelity of particular bonds over longer 124 timescales, we analyzed the annual persistence of 669 manakin partnerships from one season to the next ( Fig. 3a-b ). In this analysis, a partnership was defined as two males who interacted on a 126 display territory at least once in a given season. Annual persistence was defined as that partnership recurring at a significant rate the following year (see Methods for details). The 128 analysis accounted for the identities of the partners, the year, the lek where the partnership occurred, and other factors including the spatial overlap of the individuals. Two features 130 predominantly explained the variation in partnership persistence: the interaction frequency (edge weight), and the local social density (edge connectivity, which quantifies the number of 132 alternative paths that can connect two partners in a social network). Specifically, a partnership was more likely to persist if the two individuals interacted more frequently, but had lower 134 connectivity in their social neighborhood. These results are consistent with the phenomena observed at the network level over shorter weekly timescales ( Fig. 2) . Moreover, we found that 136 the simulation of reciprocity and heterogeneity could also recreate the empirical results found for partnership persistence ( Fig. 3c-d ). 138
These negative effects of overall network connectivity suggest that social stability is governed by a fundamental trade-off between the quantity and quality of social partnerships. 140
Contrary to the trade-off hypothesis, however, the manakins with more partners (i.e., those with higher average degree centrality) formed coalitions that were more likely to persist through time 142 ( Fig. 4a ). This apparent paradox is resolved by partitioning the variation among-and withinindividuals ( Fig. 4b-c ). Among individuals, the males who were more connected were better able 144 to maintain their partnerships ( Fig. 4b ). However, when a given male had more partners than his average, he was less able to maintain them ( Fig. 4c ). Thus, each individual may have a different 146 threshold for the number of stable coalition partnerships he is able to maintain. This explains why densely connected social networks are less stable ( Fig. 2) , even though well-connected 148
individuals are better at maintaining partnerships ( Fig. 4a-b ). In wire-tailed manakins, the proximate causes of this among-individual heterogeneity are not yet well understood (39) , but 150 could include a male's quality, age and social experience, and/or his compatibility with the other males on his lek. 152
How might the magnitude of behavioral heterogeneity influence the stability of cooperative networks (36)? Our simulation model provided an opportunity to begin exploring 154 this question. To measure heterogeneity, we computed the coefficient of variation in degree centrality (CV degree ) in each of the initial networks; higher values indicate greater behavioral 156 heterogeneity in the system (40) . We found that CV degree had a significant positive effect on subsequent network stability ( Fig. 4d ), demonstrating that individual variation in sociality can 158 foster stable social networks. This is similar to the way some ecological systems are affected by heterogeneity (e.g., CV of connectedness (degree) and edge weights) (40, 41) . In social systems, 160 behavioral heterogeneity can also include suites of correlated traits such as dispersal, risk-taking, and cognitive ability, in addition to variation in sociality (20, 34, 42) . Further study is needed to 162 understand how this covariation influences social network stability and the evolution of complex social behavior (33). 164
In summary, we find that social interactions can have opposing effects on the stability of cooperative systems. On the one hand, the stability of the social network is enhanced by 166 increasing the interaction frequency among a small number of partnerships. However, when individuals become too broadly connected, the social network can be destabilized. This is 168 because individuals are constrained in their ability to reciprocate a large number of social partnerships. Our results also highlight the fact that among-individual heterogeneity can easily 170 mask this behavioral trade-off (34). Hence, these results emphasize the importance of longitudinal data that captures multilevel variation, within-and among-individuals. 172
Can these principles be applied to other systems? Although social network stability has not yet been analyzed in humans at a broad scale, this is an important next step, given that 174 globalization and social media use have rapidly increased the breadth of human social connectivity (6, 43) . Our model provides one potential explanation for how these novel 176 behavioral interaction patterns could have a destabilizing effect on human social structure. Another important question is how much topological changes in these networks affect other 178 dynamics, such as the spread of emotions, cultural evolution, and disease transmission. Although our study focused on one type of cooperative system, many other social networks are formed as a 180 result of competitive, aggressive, mating, and information-sharing interactions (20) . As a unifying framework, we propose that social stability in these other contexts will also be 182 determined by the simple behavioral processes that generate heterogeneity, partner preferences, and the symmetry of partner choice. 184
MATERIALS AND METHODS 186

Field methods 188
Observed social networks were based on a study of wire-tailed manakins, Pipra filicauda, at the Tiputini Biodiversity Station in Ecuador (0º 38' S, 76º 08' W, 200 m elevation). Male wire-tailed 190 manakins perform cooperative courtship displays at exploded leks, where males are in acoustic but not visual contact (44). The population at Tiputini has been monitored since 2002 to study 192 the fitness benefits of cooperative behavior (22, 23) . The present study spanned three field seasons (December-March) in 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18, and used an automated proximity 194 data-logging system to record cooperative interactions among males (25, 26). Manakins were captured using mist-nets and each male was outfitted with unique color bands and a coded nano-196 tag transmitter (NTQB-2, Lotek Wireless; 0.35 g). To record the social network at a given lek, proximity data-loggers (SRX-DL800, Lotek Wireless) were deployed in each territory to record 198 all tag detections within the territory from 06:00 to 16:00 for ~6 consecutive days (± SD 1 day), which comprised a single recording session (26, 39) . Territory ownership was assigned using 200 direct observation of color-banded males at the display sites (22) , and was subsequently verified in the proximity data. Sample sizes were not predetermined because our aim was to track all 202 individuals within the studied leks (39) . In the absence of a formal mark-recapture protocol, we examined the percentage of territory-holders tagged as an indication of how well our sample 204 covered the known population (95%, 95%, and 92%, for the three respective field seasons). All animal research was approved by the Smithsonian ACUC (protocols #12-23, 14-25, and 17-11) 206 and the Ecuadorean Ministry of the Environment (MAE-DNB-CM-2015-0008). 208
Data processing All data processing and statistical analyses were performed in R 3.5.1 (45) . Male-male  210 cooperative interactions on the display territories were determined using spatiotemporal overlap of tag detections in the proximity data (26) . Specifically, a social interaction was defined as a 212 joint detection of two males within approximately 5 m on a territory during the breeding season (26) . This spatial range corresponds to the visual and acoustic contact required for a typical 214 display interaction in this species (22, 46) . Because the social interactions were measured using an automated system, the networks were constructed blind to the sociality of particular 216 individuals and/or leks. A previous validation study conducted in 2012 (25) confirmed that the social interactions defined by this automated system corresponded to direct observations of male-218 male display partnerships. We used the social interaction data to build undirected weighted social networks for each lek recording session, with each node representing a male, and the edges 220 weighted by the frequency of social interactions summed over a recording session (approx. 6 days, defined above). In total, we characterized 86 repeated measures of the social networks at 222 11 leks (mean 7.8 sessions per lek, ± SD 3.7) from 29,760 sampling session hours and 36,885 unique social interactions among 180 individuals. We used a clustering analyses in the igraph 224 package (47, 48) to verify that our sampling design was well-matched to the inherent social structure of the population (Fig. S1 ). 226
228
Network stability
The stability of social network topology is determined by both the gain and loss of associations 230 over time. We therefore defined a bidirectional metric of social network stability for binary (unweighted) networks that compares two repeated measurements of the network, N, at times t 1 232
and t 2 . The stability of N over the period
is defined as the number of social partnerships (i.e., edges) shared by N 1 and N 2 (i.e., intersection ∩ ), divided by the total number of unique 234 edge connections in either N 1 or N 2 (i.e., union ∪). Using E to represent network edges, stability is thus defined by the following formula: 236
This metric can range from 0 (unstable) to 1 (highly stable). Note that this definition would not apply to complete (fully connected) networks. In most social networks, individuals (or nodes) 238
can also be gained or lost over time, which alters the set of possible interactions that could occur.
To ensure that our measure of social network stability was based on edges that could have 240 occurred at both time points, only individuals who were present at both t 1 and t 2 were included in the calculation (49). Therefore, this definition captures the stability of relationships among 242 individuals who remained in the network over two consecutive time steps (49). Furthermore, to ensure that the stability metric was not biased by rare interactions (50), we also filtered the 244 stability calculation to be based on binary networks that included only edges that met two criteria in the empirical data: (1) a significant edge had to occur more often than its own average 246 occurrence in 1,000 random permutations of the interaction data, and (2) it had to occur at least six times during the recording session (i.e., on average, about once per day). The second criterion 248 ensured that rare interactions were not easily deemed significant. The value of six was chosen to correspond to the average number of days in each recording sessions, but we also verified that 250 other thresholds >2 did not influence our results. Finally, we verified that all of the results were also unchanged when using only the second (absolute) criterion. 252
The average stability score for the manakin networks was 0.43 (± SD 0.23, n = 60 networks at 11 leks). Note that the sample size of 60 is smaller than the total number of 254 recording sessions, because the stability dataset is limited to networks that were also sampled at t 2 within the same season. The observed networks were also more stable than expected by chance 256
(paired t-test, t = 12.08, p < 0.0001), as determined by random network rewiring (100 edge permutations for each of the 60 measurements; grand mean null expected stability 0.07 ± SD 258 0.05). 260
Network-level analyses Network size, connectivity, and structure can all influence the dynamics and stability of diverse 262 network types (40, 41) . Therefore, to determine how network-level properties at t 1 predict subsequent social network stability, we fit mixed-effects regression models using the package 264 lme4 (51) (n = 60 networks at 11 leks). The analysis included lek identity as a random effect, and to account for potential temporal trends, we also included field season (categorial) and mean 266
Julian date of the network (continuous) as two fixed effects. Mean Julian date for a network was calculated as the average date of all of the social interactions that occurred within that network. 268 We considered five network properties that have been shown to influence network dynamics in other contexts (40, 41) as additional fixed effects: (1) network weight is a measure of the average 270 relationship frequency, calculated as the mean of the log-transformed edge weights; (2) network density is a measure of the breadth of connectivity, calculated as the proportion of relationships 272 that actually occurred relative to a completely connected network; (3) clustering coefficient, or network transitivity, is an alternative measure of connectivity that is often important in social 274 networks (52) , and that describes the probability that a given individual/node's social partners are also connected; and (4) network modularity is yet another measure of connectivity that 276 describes how well the network can be subdivided into separate communities using the randomwalk algorithm (47, 48) . To account for the fact that these network-level properties often scale 278 with network size (32, 53) ( Fig. 1e-g) , we also included (5) the log-transformed number of individuals/nodes in the social network as an additional predictor. Note that unlike the 280 calculation of network stability in the previous section, all five of these network properties were computed from unfiltered network data. 282
Because density, transitivity, and modularity were all similar measures of network connectivity, and because the sample size of 60 is not enough to reasonably estimate more than 284 five or six fixed effects at a time, we used a model selection procedure to compare candidate models that included field season, date, network size, and at most two of the other network 286
properties. Given that network weight, density, and clustering coefficient were all correlated measures of connectivity, each model could include at most one of the those parameters. We also 288 considered a null model that included none of (1)-(4). Complete details are provided in Tables S1-S2. Finally, we evaluated whether network stability was influenced by two logistical factors: 290
first, sampling effort, and second, a testosterone manipulation experiment that was conducted for a separate study in 2016-17 and 2017-18 (n = 9 individuals out of 180 that were implanted with 292 testosterone (39)). To verify that these two logistical factors did not influence our results, we added additional fixed effects for the number of recording hours (median 75, mean 73 ± SD 10) 294
and/or the number of hormone-manipulated individuals in a given network (median 0, mean 0.10 ± SD 0.41), neither of which had a significant effect on network stability (all p > 0.43). We also 296 verified that all of the conclusions of the network-level analysis were unchanged when accounting for either or both of these covariates. To determine the repeatability of network 298
properties of the leks, we calculated the proportion of total variation that was due to differences among the leks using mixed-effects models with lek as the random effect and field season and 300
Julian date as fixed effects (51, 54). 302
Edge-level analysis The edge-level analysis examined the persistence of manakin social partnerships on an annual 304 timescale. This analysis considered 669 dyadic partnerships among 91 individuals wherein both individuals in the partnership were also present and tagged in the subsequent breeding season. A 306 partnership was defined as two males who had interacted on a display territory at least once. The binary response variable, partnership persistence, was defined as whether a partnership was 308 sustained and significant in the subsequent breeding season (using the criteria for significance defined above in the section "Network stability"). Because both individuals in a social 310 partnership can contribute to its fate, and because they both had other partnerships in the dataset, we modelled persistence using a multiple-membership structure in a binomial mixed-effects 312 regression model, fit with the brms package (55) . This method can be used to account for multiple partner identities within a single random effect (26, (55) (56) (57) . In our analysis, the two 314 identities were weighted equally, because we assumed they could both determine partnership persistence. An additional random effect was included to account for the lek where each 316 partnership occurred. The analysis also included fixed effects to account for the initial field season (categorical), the territorial status of the pair (categorical; either two territory-holders, a 318 territory holder plus a floater, or two floaters (22)), the sampling effort at that lek in both the initial and the subsequent field season, and the initial spatial overlap of the pair, which can 320 influence the probability of interaction (29) . Because manakins use discrete display territories, we defined the spatial overlap of two males as the log-inverse of the chi-squared statistic 322
comparing their distributions of territory detections (pings) in the proximity data; larger values of this metric indicate greater spatial overlap. 324
Based on the results of the network-level analysis, we sought to test whether edge-level network properties would predict partnership persistence. Thus, we also included the following 326 fixed effects: (1) edge weight, or the log-transformed social interaction frequency; (2) edge betweenness, a measure of social centrality, defined as the log-transformed number of shortest 328 paths passing through that edge; and (3) edge connectivity, a measure of social density, defined as the minimum number of edges that must be removed to eliminate all paths between the two 330 individuals/nodes in a partnership (48) . Edge weight and edge connectivity also correspond to the metrics of network weight and density, respectively, at the network level. In contrast, edge 332 betweenness captures a different property: a relationship with a high edge betweenness is one that links individuals from two disparate communities. If partnership maintenance is enhanced 334 when both individuals have strong links to the same local community, we expect a negative relationship between edge betweenness and persistence. Alternatively, if individuals place 336 particular value on long-range ties, partnership persistence might be positively related to betweenness. We ran four independently seeded chains with default priors, storing 2,000 samples 338 from each chain, and verifying that the convergence statistics were all equal to one (55) (Table  S4) . 340
Among-individual analysis 342
To test whether partnership persistence could be attributed to behavioral differences among individual manakins, we refit the analysis described above, but without accounting for (1)-(3) 344 listed above. The random intercepts from this model provide an estimate of among-individual variation in social stability (26, 54) . We hypothesized that the following behavioral phenotypes 346 (26) could affect this trait: (1) a male's average daily effort, measured using his log-transformed count of detections (pings) on the leks; (2) his average daily strength, using his log-transformed 348 sum of interaction frequencies; (3) his average daily degree, using his log-transformed number of social partnerships, and (4) and his average daily social importance, defined as the exclusivity of 350 his partnerships (see the previous protocol (26) for additional details). Because these four phenotypes were also correlated (26, 39), we compared six candidate regression models, four of 352 which included only one behavioral phenotype, one of which included all four phenotypes, and one of which included no behavioral phenotypes (n = 91 individuals; see Table S5 ). All 354 candidate models included a male's status as either a territory-holder or floater. 356
Quantity-quality trade-off analysis
We next sought to test the hypothesis that individuals in a network face a trade-off between the 358 quantity (number of partners) and stability of their social partnerships. Because amongindividual variance can mask trade-offs that occur within-individuals (58), testing this hypothesis 360 requires a variance-partitioning approach. To achieve this, we defined repeated measures of individual partnership maintenance as the proportion of a male's coalition partners that were 362 maintained from a given recording session to the next recording session (n = 565 repeated measures of 152 individuals). Similar to our other analyses, a partnership was defined as two 364 males having at least one interaction during a recording session. Note that a male had to be present, tagged, detected, and not part of the hormone manipulation experiment in both the initial 366 and subsequent recording sessions to be included in this sample. We used within-group centering to partition the variation in the predictor variable, degree centrality, within-and among-368 individuals (59). The first step was to determine log-transformed degree for each male in each recording session; next, we took a single average degree value per male; and finally, we 370 calculated relative degree in each recording session as a male's log-transformed degree minus his overall average. Thus, average and relative degree represent two orthogonal predictors that can 372 be analyzed within the same regression model. The analysis was fit as a binomial mixed-effects model in lme4 (51) with a random effect of individual identity, and it also included two 374 categorical fixed effects to account for field season and territorial status, respectively, as well as a continuous fixed effect to account for sampling effort (Table S6) . 376 To evaluate what would be expected in this analysis by chance alone, we repeated the analysis using randomly permuted networks. To do this, we used permutations of the manakin 378 data wherein each lek social network was randomly rewired between each recording session (48) . We generated 1,000 of these randomized datasets and then performed the same repeated-380 measures analysis that was applied to the observed data. We averaged the results across all 1,000 randomized analyses to derive the null expectation shown in Fig. S2 . 382
Individual-based simulation models 384
To provide a mechanistic explanation for how individual behavior scales up to influence social network stability, we developed a simple individual-based simulation model. The model was 386 based on the general principles of social reciprocity (24) and among-individual behavioral heterogeneity. There were three core assumptions: (i) individuals had to actively choose each 388 other in order to form a partnership; (ii) each individual had a ranked set of preferences for social partners, predicted only by its previous social interaction frequencies in the initial network, and 390 (iii) individuals expressed consistent differences in their social behavior (referred to as behavioral phenotype). The second rule (ii) is supported by strong evidence that social 392 relationships are non-random and persist over long time-scales in human and nonhuman animals (7, 29). Together, rules (i) and (ii) also represent a form of reciprocal altruism (24) , because prior 394
interactions increase the probability that a partner will be re-chosen. Rule (iii) represents a phenomenon that is often referred to as among-individual variation, heterogeneity, or 396
personality; it has empirical support across vertebrates (34), including in manakins (26) .
To experimentally test the effects of network size, weight, and density on network 398 stability, we generated 3,000 initial networks with diverse properties that were within the range of the observed data. Network size was first chosen from the range of 11-20 individuals or nodes 400 (10 size bins). To manipulate network density along the same range observed in the manakin data, we first generated completely connected networks, and then randomly removed edges until 402 a target initial density was achieved (targets ranging from 0.2-0.8, for a total of 20 target density bins). To generate a broad range of initial network weights, each edge weight was first sampled 404 from the manakin data, and then multiplied by a weight constant ranging from 0.2-2.0 (15 weight factor bins). The resulting edge weights were then rounded up, to a maximum of 500. We 406 generated 3,000 networks with all possible combinations of these network properties (10 x 15 x 20 = 3,000). 408
The simulation proceeded as follows. First, to satisfy rule (ii), we assigned a set of preferences to each node based on that node's partnerships in the initial starting network. The set 410 of preferences included all other nodes, ranked by interaction frequency with the focal node in the initial network. Hence, the probability of choice was correlated with initial interaction 412 frequency. To satisfy rule (iii), each node was also allotted a specific number of interaction attempts per time step (ranging from 1-4). This number was calculated by log-transforming the 414 strength of the focal node in the initial network (also referred to as weighted degree) to obtain its behavioral phenotype; higher values meant that a node could attempt more social interactions per 416 unit time. To satisfy rule (i), a partnership was only formed if both nodes chose each other within a given time step. The simulation ran over five time steps and the final network was determined 418 by summing the new interactions that occurred (Fig. S3 ). No filtering was applied to calculate network stability in the simulation. Note that for simplicity, the preference ranks for (ii) were not 420 updated during the time steps that occurred within the simulation. For the null model, we followed the same procedures above, except that each individual's 422 partner choice probabilities were assigned randomly to the set of all other nodes, the number of attempted interactions per time step was fixed across individuals, and reciprocal partner choice 424
was not required for partnership formation in the null model (i.e., assumptions ii, iii, and i were removed). We also tested models with either (i), (ii), or (iii) alone. After running the simulations, 426
we used linear models to statistically analyze the variation in network stability and examine the three predictors of interest from Table S2 : network size, weight, and density. To compare the 428 results of this analysis with the statistical estimates derived from the observed data, all predictors and response variables were standardized to have a mean of 0 and SD of 1 (Table S3 ). To test 430 whether the simulation model of reciprocity and heterogeneity could also explain our edge-level analysis, we used a binomial mixed-effects regression of edge persistence in the simulation, with 432 the identity of the initial network as a random effect, and edge weight and edge connectivity as the predictors. 434 We chose five as the number of time steps in these simulations to correspond to a period of about five days of behavioral activity. To verify that the results of the simulation model would 436 be robust to alternative time parameters, we also repeated these analyses using simulations with either three or ten time steps instead. In each case, we reached the same conclusions with nearly 438 identical effect sizes for network size, weight, and density, respectively (Table S3 ). 440
Data deposition
The data and R code necessary to reproduce our results are available at: 442 https://figshare.com/s/470aeac186a9dab72860 444 Repeatability of network properties ± 95% confidence intervals (n = 86 repeated measures, 60 for stability, of 11 lek networks). 596
Fig. 2. A model of reciprocity and behavioral heterogeneity predicts network stability. (A-598
B), The stability of a social network is positively associated with the average frequency of interactions (weight), whereas stability is negatively associated with the relative density of 600 network connections. These effects were confirmed in an individual-based simulation of reciprocity that combined three behavioral rules: (i) a requirement for reciprocal partner choice, 602
(ii) a preference for previous partners, and (iii) repeatable variation among individuals in social behavior. The left columns in A and B show partial residual scatterplots from the statistical 604 analyses, after accounting for additional covariates (Tables S1-S3 ; n = 60 for the observed networks and n = 3,000 for the simulations). Because the simulation sample sizes are so large, 606
shading is used on the simulation scatterplots to show the 95% central range of data binned along the x-axis instead of plotting individual points. The right columns in A and B show the 608 standardized effect sizes (± 95% confidence intervals for the observed networks; these intervals are also extended with shading for direct comparison with the simulations). The coefficients 610 derived from the individual-based model fall within the 95% confidence intervals of the observed data, unlike the null model (which was a simulation with rules i-iii removed). Note that 612 the 95% confidence intervals for all simulation effect sizes are not shown because they are narrower than the data points. 614 probability that a partnership persisted across years was greater when the two partners interacted at a higher frequency (edge weight), but had fewer alternate paths connecting them in the social 618 network (edge connectivity). Data points show how edge weight and connectivity (x-axes) determine the predicted probability of partnership persistence (y-axis) in a multiple-membership 620 analysis (n = 669 partnerships among 91 individuals). (C-D) The influence of edge weight and connectivity is also found in the individual-based model of reciprocity described in Fig. 2 . 622
Shaded areas in C-D show the 95% central range for partial residuals binned along the x-axis. 624 Fig. 4. Behavioral heterogeneity and social stability. (A) The males who consistently interacted with more partners per day (high average daily degree, x-axis) promoted long-term 626 
Fig. 2. A model of reciprocity and behavioral heterogeneity predicts network stability.
( A-B) , The stability of a social network is positively associated with the average frequency of interactions (weight), whereas stability is negatively associated with the relative density of network connections. These effects were confirmed in an individual-based simulation of reciprocity that combined three behavioral rules: (i) a requirement for reciprocal partner choice, (ii) a preference for previous partners, and (iii) repeatable variation among individuals in social behavior. The left columns in A and B show partial residual scatterplots from the statistical analyses, after accounting for additional covariates (Tables S1-S3 ; n = 60 for the observed networks and n = 3,000 for the simulations). Because the simulation sample sizes are so large, shading is used on the simulation scatterplots to show the 95% central range of data binned along the x-axis instead of plotting individual points. The right columns in A and B show the standardized effect sizes (± 95% confidence intervals for the observed networks; these intervals are also extended with shading for direct comparison with the simulations). The coefficients derived from the individual-based model fall within the 95% confidence intervals of the observed data, unlike the null model (which was a simulation with rules i-iii removed). Note that the 95% confidence intervals for all simulation effect sizes are not shown because they are narrower than the data points. at times when a given male had more partners than his average in c, he was less able to maintain stable partnerships. To visualize among-and within-individual variation, a single average is plotted for each male in B (± SE if a male had >3 measurements), whereas a separate linear fit is shown for individuals with >3 measurements in C. (D) In a simulation model, social networks with greater among-individual behavioral heterogeneity (CVdegree) were also more temporally stable. The y-axis shows partial residuals from an analysis that also accounts for the effects of network size, weight, and density (n = 3,000). Shading indicates the 95% central range for partial residuals binned along the x-axis. 
